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Interest rate policy or monetary base 






The primary objective of the euro area’s monetary policy is 
price stability. That is why the Eurosystem bases its mon-
etary policy strategy primarily on a quantitative definition 
of price stability. The ECB Governing Council defines price 
stability as a year-on-year increase in the HICP for the euro 
area of less than – but close to – 2 p.c. in the medium 
term. There can therefore be no doubt about the ultimate 
objective  of  monetary  policy,  even  if  the  medium-term 
orientation of this definition provides the necessary scope 
for a gradual approach to avoid undesirable volatility in 
economic activity and interest rates.
Furthermore, the monetary policy strategy is based on an 
analytical framework comprising two pillars, namely the 
economic analysis and the monetary analysis. The former 
assesses the economic and financial developments and the 
inherent risks to price stability. The latter examines devel-
opments in the money supply, lending and their compo-
nents, and looks for signals of relevance for longer-term 
inflationary trends. Although the Eurosystem’s monetary 
policy strategy accords an important role to the move-
ment in the money supply, it does not react mechanically 
to monetary developments. In other words, movements 
in the money supply do not constitute an intermediate 
target. Nor does the economic analysis provide an inter-
mediate objective. For example, the Eurosystem does not 
react mechanically to the inflation projections. In contrast, 
the Governing Council’s decision-making process is very 
broad, and is based more specifically on the signals which 
appear relevant once both types of information have been 
cross-checked.
In  the  very  short  term,  the  Eurosystem  uses  its  open 
market  operations  to  steer  the  money  market  interest 
rate. This implies that, in practice, the Eurosystem con-
ducts an interest rate policy, which means influencing the 
term structure of interest rates by steering the short-term 
interest rate, and thus also influencing the real economy, 
the money supply and inflation. For that purpose, at the 
beginning of each month the Governing Council deter-
mines the key rates which indicate the monetary policy 
stance. The minimum bid rate of the main refinancing 
operations is particularly important here. The operational 
framework  for  conducting  monetary  policy  is  designed 
to stabilise the overnight interest rate at the level of the 
minimum bid rate set by the Governing Council. Another 
article in this Economic Review gives a detailed descrip-
tion of how this mechanism works.  (1) In theory, however, 
other options are also possible. For instance, the central 
bank  could  actively  manage  the  monetary  base,  also 
known as central bank money (see the definition below 
for more details) instead of the money market interest 
rate, which in principle should make it possible to influ-
ence money creation on the part of credit institutions, 
and  hence  the  real  economy  and  inflation.  Since  the 
monetary  base  concept  is  closely  linked  to  the  money 
(*)  The authors would like to thank Serge Bertholomé, Hugues Famerée and  
Vincent Périlleux for helpful comments.
(1)  Aucremanne, L., J. Boeckx and O. Vergote (2007) : “The liquidity management of 
the Eurosystem during the period of financial market turmoil”, National Bank of 
Belgium Economic Review, 27-41.
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supply   concept, and given the primary role of the money 
supply in the monetary policy strategy, one might even 
think that the monetary base is perhaps a better target. 
This article reviews the advantages and disadvantages of 
these two options and clearly explains the reasons why 
central banks of countries with well-developed financial 
markets nowadays prefer to steer short-term interest rates 
rather  than  the  monetary  base.  Finally,  the  article  also 
demonstrates that the pursuit of either of these objectives 
has specific consequences for the dynamics of a central 
bank’s balance sheet and for its interpretation. More par-
ticularly, the article shows that a policy of steering inter-
est rates implies that the central bank’s balance sheet is 
endogenous and therefore no longer supplies information 
on the monetary policy stance. The sometimes abundant 
provision of liquidity during the period of financial turmoil 
that began in the summer of 2007 – and which forms 
the subject of another article in this Economic Review – 
therefore performs no function in signalling the monetary 
policy stance.
The article is arranged as follows. The first section briefly 
examines  the  link  between  the  central  bank  balance 
sheet, the monetary base, the total money supply and 
lending.  The  second  section  focuses  on  the  choice  of 
either the interest rate or the monetary base as the opera-
tional target, and identifies the factors which determine 
the  choice  made  by  central  banks.  Finally,  the  article 
examines how a policy of steering interest rates affects 
the interpretation of a central bank’s balance sheet.
1.    A central bank’s balance sheet and 
the money supply
The Eurosystem’s balance sheet is closely linked to the 
money market. The liabilities side of the balance sheet 
records the monetary base, which stands for the most 
liquid forms of money, and central banks have a monop-
oly  on  its  creation.  That  explains  why  it  is  also  called 
central bank money. The monetary base comprises the 
fiduciary issue (banknotes and coins in circulation), the 
reserves (largely compulsory) held by the counterparties of 
the Eurosystem, and recourse to the deposit facility. The 
monetary base can be regarded as the basic component 
of the total money supply which, apart from banknotes in 
circulation, comprises book-entry money issued by credit 
institutions. The box explains the precise operation of this 
principle whereby “loans make deposits”.
Regarding the creation of book-entry money, it should be 
noted that there are various forms of deposits and that 
it is their degree of liquidity (i.e. convertibility to means 
of payment) that distinguishes them from one another. 
Given  that  the  nature  and  characteristics  of  financial 
assets,  transactions  and  means  of  payment  vary  over 
time, it is not always easy, a priori, to define money. The 
movement in a number of monetary aggregates is there-
fore analysed, taking account of the fact that a narrow 
aggregate may omit movements in substitutes similar to 
money, while a broad aggregate may overestimate the 
function of money as a means of payment. These mon-
etary aggregates differ in the degree of liquidity of the 
component assets. 
The narrow monetary aggregate M1 comprises fiduciary 
money  (banknotes  and  coins)  and  sight  deposits.  The 
latter  can  be  converted  into  cash  immediately  or  used 
for  book-entry  payments.  The  intermediate  monetary 
aggregate  M2  comprises  M1  plus  time  deposits  at  up 
to  two  years  and  deposits  redeemable  at  up  to  three 
months’  notice.  These  deposits  can  be  converted  into 
M1 components, but in some cases there may be restric-
tions, such as a period of notice, penalties or fees. The 
difference between the intermediate monetary aggregate 
and the narrow aggregate (M2-M1) can be described as 
other  short-term  deposits.  The  broad  monetary  aggre-
gate M3 comprises M2 plus certain tradable instruments 
issued by monetary financial institutions (MFIs), which also 
include credit institutions. These tradable instruments are 
repurchase agreements, money market fund shares/units 
and debt instruments with a maturity of up to two years 
(including  money  market  paper).  Owing  to  their  high 
degree of liquidity, these instruments are close substitutes 
for deposits. Since they are included in M3, this aggregate 
is  less  affected  by  transfers  between  the  various  liquid 
asset categories than the narrower monetary aggregates, 
and  is  therefore  more  stable.  The  difference  between 
the broad and intermediate aggregates (M3-M2) can be 
described as tradable instruments.
Since  the  creation  of  the  European  monetary  union, 
there has been a great deal of substitution between the 
various M3 components, so that this broad aggregate has 
proved to be more stable than the narrower aggregates. 
In particular, since the end of 2005, the strong expansion 
of M3 has been less and less influenced by the narrow 
monetary aggregate and is increasingly affected by other 
short-term deposits and tradable instruments. The period 
of rising interest rates which began in December 2005 
in fact makes cash and sight deposits less attractive than 
other  short-term  deposits  or  tradable  debt  instruments 
on which the remuneration stays more closely in line with 
money market interest rates. 
So far, the interest rate hikes have only triggered substi-
tution effects between the various components of M3, 
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the M3 growth which came to 11.3 p.c. in September 
2007. That dynamic is driven to a considerable extent by 
port  folio reallocation, essentially because the relatively flat 
yield curve enhances the attraction of short-term invest-
ments, some of which are included in M3. Moreover, less 
risky assets have probably tempted more investors recently, 
in view of the financial market volatility. There had already 
been  substantial  portfolio  reallocations  previously,  after 
the bursting of the technology bubble between 2001 and 
2003, when residents had liquidated foreign assets and 
then invested the money in less risky assets included in 
M3. It is also possible that the substantial growth of the 
money supply is due to a structural change in behaviour 
causing a break in the demand for money in response to 
the new environment of stable prices and low interest 
rates. It is precisely because of the difficulty in determining 
in real time the extent to which demand for money is gen-
erated by a transaction motive – as that is the main type 
of demand affecting price stability – that the monetary 
analysis, important though it is, is only one of the factors 
influencing the Governing Council’s monetary policy deci-
sions. Moreover, it is assumed that the monetary analysis 
essentially signals the risks to price stability in the medium 
and long term. At those horizons, portfolio reallocations 




















CHART 1  M3 AND ITS COMPONENTS
  (data adjusted for seasonal and calendar effects; contribution 
to the change in M3 compared to the corresponding month 
of the previous year, percentage points unless otherwise 
stated)
Source : ECB.
(1)  Percentage changes compared to the corresponding month of the previous year.








Box – Money multipliers and their behaviour since 1999
The use of the term “monetary base” originates from the fact that it can be regarded as the basic component of 
the total money supply. Apart from banknotes and coins, it also includes the short-term deposits held with MFIs 
and generated in accordance with the principle that “loans make deposits”. Credit institutions are able to lend to 
the public the reserves at their disposal. After use, these funds are re-deposited – not necessarily with the same 
bank, but that aspect is irrelevant since the analysis concerns the banking sector as a whole – before being lent 
again and re-deposited by the public. However, the monetary expansion which this process creates is limited by the 
reserve requirements which credit institutions have to respect and by the public’s preference for banknotes.
Thus, supposing the central bank sets a 10 p.c. ratio for the reserve requirements and, via an open market 
operation, buys a security worth 100 from a bank. The money is paid into the reserve account, which the credit 
institution holds with the central bank, causing an increase in the excess reserves and hence in the monetary base 
of 100 (t=1). The credit institution can convert its excess reserves into a loan, so that the associated formation of 
a deposit will initially lead to an increase in the money supply (M) of 100 (t=2). The banks have to hold 10 p.c. of 
this sum in the form of required reserves. The required reserves therefore increase by 10 and the excess reserves are 
reduced by 10. If the public always wants to retain 10 p.c. in the form of banknotes, then the notes in circulation 
and the money supply increase by 10. Conversely, the excess reserves are again reduced by 10, bringing them 
down to 80. 80 is therefore the maximum that can be lent (t=3), which causes another increase in the required 
reserves and banknotes amounting to 8, while the excess reserves are reduced by the same amount each time.   
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If this process continues, the deposits will ultimately increase by 500 and banknotes by 50, so that the total money 
supply will expand by 550 while the original amount injected was 100. The ratio between the monetary base and 
the money supply is represented by the money multiplier ΔM/ΔMB, which in this example is 5.5.
Taking account of the factors cited, it is possible to formulate a money multiplier. For this purpose, the preference 
for banknotes (c) and the reserve requirement ratio (r) are defined respectively as the banknotes in circulation and 
the required reserves as ratios of the total volume of deposits held with the MFIs. The total money supply can then 
be expressed as a multiple of the monetary base :
M = (1+c)/(c+r)MB.
This formula clearly reveals that the money multiplier declines in the event of an increase in the reserve requirement 
ratio or the preference for banknotes. 
This mechanism implies that the major part of money creation takes place outside the central bank and is reflected 
in the consolidated balance sheet of the MFIs in the form of deposits. The banknotes and coins are also recorded 
on the consolidated balance sheet of the MFI sector, since the latter also comprises the central bank. The reserves 
which credit institutions hold with the central bank do not appear on the consolidated balance sheet, since they 
constitute both credit institution assets and central bank liabilities. They are therefore not included in the total 
money supply.
By calculating the ratio between the various monetary aggregates and the monetary base, it is possible to obtain 
a money multiplier for each aggregate. In this context, what matters is not so much the level of the multiplier but 
rather its movement over time. A stable multiplier would mean that the central bank could manage the aggregate 
money supply by controlling the monetary base. As will be explained later, a stable multiplier is therefore one of 
the conditions for steering the monetary base rather than interest rates.
Since the move to monetary union, the money multipliers initially increased before gradually reverting to their 
original level. That movement is attributable to the introduction of euro banknotes and coins, which briefly 
exerted a negative effect on the use of fiduciary money, and hence on the monetary base. This event had very 
little influence on the aggregate M3, since it involved substitution between two components of the broad money 
supply, thereby driving up the money multiplier. Although this was a single instance illustrating a very unstable 
multiplier, it is evident that the money multiplier is generally unstable. That instability is due to financial innovations 
MONEY CREATION AND THE MONEY MULTIPLIER







   
Cumulative effect
 
Monetary base  ............ +100 … 100
Reserves :
Excess  ................. +100 −10 −10 −8 −8 … 0
Compulsory   ............. +10 +8 … 50
Banknotes  ................ +10 +8 … 50
Deposits   .................. +100 +80 … 500
Money supply  ............. +100 +10 +80 +8 … 550
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and structural adjustments that are difficult for the central bank to predict. Modest fluctuations in the multipliers 
generate large fluctuations in the aggregates, hampering the conduct of a monetary base policy. Moreover, such a 
policy should be conducted from day to day, so that in this context it would be necessary to calculate the relevant 
variability of the money multipliers on the basis of daily data (which are not available) on the monetary aggregates, 
rather than monthly data. On a daily basis the multipliers are most probably even more volatile. Thus, it is rather 
unlikely that the granting of sometimes abundant liquidity, as occurred in the period of financial turmoil, forming 
the subject of a separate article in this Economic Review, will have exerted a proportionate effect on the total 























(ratios base on monthly data (1))
Sources : ECB, NBB.
(1)  Ratio between monetary aggregates and monetary base.
2.    Monetary base policy versus interest 
rate policy
A central bank chooses between a monetary base policy 
and an interest rate policy. In so far as it has a monopoly 
on the creation of the monetary base, it can fix either the 
price i or the quantity B. In other words, it can choose 
a point on the liquidity demand curve and arrive at that 
point either by fixing the level of the monetary base or 
by fixing the level of interest rates. Under stable market 
conditions,  the  choice  between  price  and  quantity  is 
irrelevant. Thus, to arrive at point A on the demand curve 
D0 , the central bank can either announce a monetary 
base level equal to B* , which implies an interest rate i0, 
or announce an interest rate equal to i* and, to achieve 
that, adjust the monetary base to B0. The two procedures 
lead to the same outcome. However, if liquidity demand 
becomes  unstable  as  a  result  of  shocks,  the  effect  on 
interest rates and on the monetary base will depend on 
the chosen target. Thus, in the case of a policy of steering 
the monetary base, if demand shifts from D0 to D1, the 
monetary base will be unchanged so that the increased 
demand will not be met and the interest rate will increase 
from i0 to i1. The interest rate fluctuations will be larger 
the  lower  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  liquidity,  which 
corresponds to a steep demand curve. In the case of a 
policy of steering interest rates, demand for extra liquidity 
will prompt the central bank to provide additional liquid-
ity in order to keep the interest rate unchanged, and the 
monetary base will increase from B0 to B1. That therefore 22
implies that the monetary base may vary in the case of a 
policy of steering interest rates, whereas it is the interest 
rate that may fluctuate in the case of a policy of steering 
the monetary base. That is why the two procedures are 
mutually exclusive. If the central bank chooses to steer 
the interest rate, the monetary base varies and the central 
bank  cannot  control  it.  Conversely,  if  the  central  bank 
chooses  to  steer  the  monetary  base,  the  interest  rate 
cannot be fixed.
The choice between steering the monetary base or the 
interest rate depends on the stability of their relationship 
with  the  final  target.  The  link  between  the  instrument 
and the operational target is normally strong, since the 
refinancing  operations  are  an  efficient  monetary  policy 
instrument. However, when market conditions are unsta-
ble, the central bank may experience more problems in 
attaining very precisely the operational target which it has 
set itself (see another article in this Economic Review for 
a discussion of liquidity management during the recent 
period of financial turmoil).
The  ease  of  controlling  a  monetary  aggregate  such  as 
M3  by  means  of  the  monetary  base  depends  on  the 
stability of the money multiplier. The stability of demand 
for money also plays a vital role in the link between the 
money supply and inflation. Conversely, the transmission 
of a policy of steering the interest rate depends more on 
the  interest  rate  term  structure  than  on  the  monetary 
aggregates.  Since  the  level  of  interest  rates  influences 
investment  and  consumption  decisions,  the  stability  of 
aggregate demand is a key factor in this case. In short, 
the choice between one operational target or the other 
can  only  be  made  by  viewing  the  relative  stability  of   
the money multiplier and money demand in the context 
of the stability of aggregate demand.
Generally  speaking,  an  economy  is  affected  by  both 
aggregate demand and money demand shocks. The best 
choice of operational target therefore does not depend 
on the occurrence of specific shocks, but rather on their 
relative  strength.  Using  a  simple  model,  Poole  (1970) 
demonstrated  that  the  choice  between  steering  the   
interest rate or steering the monetary base depends on 
the scale of the shocks affecting the money demand in 
relation to those affecting aggregate demand.  (1) 
The effect of these various shocks can be illustrated by a 
graph of the IS-LM model, in which the IS curve reflects 
equilibrium on the goods market and LM represents equi-
librium on the money market.  (2) Equilibrium on the goods 
market implies a negative relationship between the level 
of interest rates (i) and economic activity (Y), because a 
higher interest rate makes investment and consumption 
less attractive. Equilibrium on the money market implies a 
positive relationship between interest rates and economic 

















CHART 2  IMPLICATIONS OF CONDUCTING A MONETARY BASE POLICY AND AN INTEREST RATE POLICY
STEERING THE MONETARY BASE STEERING INTEREST RATES
(1)  Cf. Walsh (2003) for more details.
(2)  Cf. e.g. Mishkin (2000).interest rAte policy or monetAry BAse policy :  
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demand for money. That in turn leads to an increase in 
the interest rate if the supply of money is unchanged. The 
two markets are simultaneously in equilibrium at the point 
where the two curves intersect : that is the case at interest 
rate i* and activity level Y*. This graph, which provides 
a clear illustration of the effect of the various shocks, is 
nevertheless  based  on  a  number  of  assumptions.  First, 
for simplicity, the price level is disregarded so that infla-
tion expectations are absent and it is only the nominal 
interest rate that matters (it then corresponds in fact to 
the  expected  real  interest  rate).  Second,  the  ultimate 
aim of the central bank in this example is no longer the 
maintenance of price stability but stabilisation of the level 
of activity, which can be interpreted as the output gap. A 
more realistic representation of the economy should also 
consider  the  aggregate  supply,  which  links  the  output 
gap and inflation, although that is not strictly necessary 
to illustrate the factors determining the choice of opera-
tional target. However, this simplified presentation is not 
unrealistic, since fluctuations in the output gap do in fact 
have an impact on inflation.
When an economy encounters shocks affecting aggregate 
demand, IS oscillates around its equilibrium position, IS*. 
In the example, the IS curve moves between IS’ and IS’’. 
If the central bank has opted for the interest rate as its 
operational target, it lets the money supply vary (causing 
a shift in the LM curve) in order to keep interest rates 
constant. Ultimately, output will therefore vary between 
YI’ (if the shock is negative) and YI“ (if the shock is posi-
tive). If the operational target is the monetary base, the 
central bank does not intervene (LM remains unchanged), 
leading to variations in interest rates. These movements 
moderate  the effect  on  output, which  moves between 
Y’ M and Y’‘ M . In fact, a negative shock affecting demand 
causes interest rates to fall, curbing the contraction of 
activity.  Conversely,  a  positive  shock  affecting  demand 
causes interest rates to rise, slowing down the expansion 
of activity. Since the monetary base policy entails a smaller 
variation in economic activity, it is preferable in that case 
to  opt  for  such  a  strategy  rather  than  an  interest  rate 
policy, as to some extent it generates interest rate fluctua-
tions which attenuate the impact on economic activity of 
the shocks affecting aggregate demand.
In the case of shocks affecting money demand, the LM 
curve becomes uncertain and unstable. The expected LM 
curve  is  LM*,  but  following  these  shocks  LM  oscillates 
between LM’ (if the shock is positive) and LM’’ (if the 
shock is negative). In the case of an interest rate policy, 
the money supply is adjusted to bring the LM curve back 
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CHART 3  CHOICE BETWEEN A MONETARY BASE POLICY AND AN INTEREST RATE POLICY
MONEY DEMAND SHOCK AGGREGATE DEMAND SHOCK
Fluctuation in economic activity in the case of an interest rate policy
Fluctuation in economic activity in the case of a monetary base policy24
A constant interest rate (and an unchanged IS curve) has 
no effect on output. In the case of a monetary base policy, 
the LM curve can shift, causing interest rates to change. 
A rise in demand for money pushes up the interest rate, 
causing output to fall to Y’ M, while a decline in demand 
for  money  causes  interest  rates  to  fall  so  that  output 
increases to Y’‘ M. As the variations in interest rates induced 
by a monetary base policy are not desirable in the absence 
of shocks affecting aggregate demand, an interest rate 
policy is to be preferred. Unlike the monetary base policy, 
it does not cause inefficient fluctuations in output in the 
event of shocks affecting money demand.
An interest rate policy is preferred where money demand 
is  relatively  unstable  and  money  demand  shocks  pre-
dominate. Conversely, a monetary base policy is preferred 
where aggregate demand is relatively unstable and hence 
where shocks affecting aggregate demand predominate. 
The impact also differs according to the economy’s sen-
sitivity  to  the  various  shocks,  which  is  reflected  in  the 
slope of the IS and LM curves. In short, the more frequent 
the money demand shocks and the greater their impact 
on the real economy – reflected in a flat IS curve and a 
steep LM curve – the more an interest rate policy is to be 
preferred. 
It is clear from the box above that the money multiplier 
is unstable. The link between the movement in M3 and 
prices is also rather unstable in the short term, as portfo-
lio adjustments may play a dominant role in determining 
demand for money. Moreover, the instability of money 
demand  on  a  daily  basis,  like  the  money  multiplier,  is 
probably  greater  than  suggested  by  the  monthly  data 
used to examine the movement in M3. The finding that 
instability increases in the event of a switch to a daily fre-
quency (relevant for the operational conduct of monetary 
policy) is also valid for the IS curve, but probably more so 
for the LM curve. Consequently, that switch reinforces the 
comparative advantage of an interest rate policy. Applied 
to the sometimes large increase in demand for liquidity 
during the period of financial market tension which began 
in  August  2007  –  concerning  money  demand  shocks 
rather than shifts in aggregate demand – this framework 
implies that it is desirable to stabilise interest rates in such 
an environment (see also Noyer (2007) on this subject).
Like the Eurosystem, many central banks of industrialised 
countries with well-developed financial markets display a 
preference for an interest rate policy. Interest rates also 
make it possible to give a clear signal, probably better 
than  a  monetary  base  policy  where  opposing  move-
ments in the different aggregates could cause confusion. 
Moreover, money market interest rates can be constantly 
monitored, making this policy more transparent, whereas 
the aggregates can only be examined less frequently and 
after a time lag. Lower interest rate volatility also makes it 
easier for banks to manage their liquidity. 
The  fact  that  the  Eurosystem’s  operational  framework 
gives priority to interest rates does not, however, imply 
that monetary developments are of no importance in the 
attainment of the ultimate objective, namely price stabil-
ity. The growth of the money supply is not steered, but it 
is examined as an element in the monetary analysis which, 
like the economic analysis, forms a separate pillar of the 
Eurosystem’s  monetary  policy  strategy.  That  key  role  is 
based in particular on the close link apparent in the past 
between fundamental movements in the growth of the 
money supply and fundamental movements in inflation. 
These  fundamental  movements  are  based  on  medium- 
and  long-term  developments,  i.e.  horizons  relevant  for 
the monetary analysis. At those horizons, the instability 
problems mentioned above, which could seriously disrupt 
the operational conduct of monetary policy, are in prin-
ciple less acute. However, as already stated, a detailed 
analysis of monetary developments is still needed in order 
to arrive at an accurate assessment of their impact on 
price stability.
3.    Implications of an interest rate policy 
for a central bank’s balance sheet
The choice of the operational target has implications for 
the movement in, and interpretation of, the items on a 
central bank’s balance sheet and short-term interest rates. 
If a central bank opts for an interest rate policy, the rate 
signals the monetary policy stance. Money market liquid-
ity is managed in order to align money market interest 
rates with the key interest rate. Even under tense market 
conditions such as those experienced since August 2007, 
appropriate liquidity management enabled the Eurosystem 
to preserve the signalling function of the monetary policy 
stance  performed  by  money  market  interest  rates.  The 
supply  of  liquidity  is  therefore  adjusted  to  demand,  so 
that fluctuations in demand for liquidity cause changes in 
the balance sheet items of the central bank, making that 
balance sheet endogenous. Thus, the amount of bank-
notes recorded on the consolidated balance sheet of the 
Eurosystem reflects demand at the prevailing interest rate, 
so that the banknotes can be regarded as an autonomous 
factor in an analytical presentation of the Eurosystem’s 
consolidated balance sheet. The amount of the current 
account  assets  held  with  the  Eurosystem  reflects  the 
banking system’s demand for central bank reserves. That 
also means that the sometimes substantial injections of 
liquidity,  implying  a  strong  increase  in  current  account 
assets held with the Eurosystem, do not give any signal interest rAte policy or monetAry BAse policy :  
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regarding the monetary policy stance, and in particular do 
not herald any easing of policy.
Furthermore, the reserve requirements are not an active 
monetary  policy  instrument.  Although  in  theory  they 
make it possible to curb money creation, this is not an 
efficient instrument. In particular, it would be necessary 
to make tiny adjustments to the reserve ratio in order to 
adjust the money supply, while the effect of those adjust-
ments would be difficult to estimate in view of the insta-
bility of the money multiplier. Moreover, frequent changes 
to the reserve ratio would make it singularly complicated 
for credit institutions to manage their liquidity. Conversely, 
the reserves do perform two other more technical func-
tions  in  the  Eurosystem’s  operational  framework.  First, 
the  reserve  requirements  generate  automatic  demand 
for  central  bank  reserves,  thus  boosting  the  structural 
demand for liquidity. Credit institutions therefore depend 
on the Eurosystem to satisfy this refinancing requirement, 
which facilitates liquidity management. Second, they act 
as a liquidity buffer, facilitating the banks’ liquidity man-
agement. It is precisely because the reserve requirement 
applies to the average assets held on current accounts 
with the Eurosystem over the reserve maintenance period 
that credit institutions can easily smooth the effects of 
unexpected variations in liquidity. This mechanism is also 
intended to stabilise money market interest rates during 
the reserve maintenance period, an effect which obviously 
disappears at the end of that period. In the case of the 
Eurosystem, the reserve requirements therefore have an 
operational function independent of the monetary policy 
stance which the Governing Council wishes to signal.
Conclusion
This article looked at the link between the balance sheet 
of  a  central  bank,  the  monetary  base,  the  monetary 
aggregates  and  lending  in  the  euro  area.  It  also  con-
sidered how these elements influence the Eurosystem’s 
ultimate objective, namely price stability. In addition, it 
paid  special  attention  to  the  choice  of  the  operational 
target. It emerged that conditions are more favourable to 
the conduct of an interest rate policy than the conduct of 
a monetary base policy, as the uncertainty generated by 
money demand shocks and money multiplier instability is 
more apparent than that generated by aggregate demand 
shocks, particularly in the very short term which is the 
relevant horizon for the operational conduct of monetary 
policy. That is why the central banks of countries with 
well-developed  financial  markets  currently  conduct  an 
interest rate policy.
The  pursuit  of  an  interest  rate  policy  implies  that  the 
central  bank’s  balance  sheet  is  endogenous.  Demand 
for liquidity is satisfied by the central bank in order to 
stabilise the interest rate at the desired level. Fluctuations 
in demand for liquidity therefore lead to changes in the 
balance  sheet  items.  That  also  indicates  that  it  is  not   
the monetary base but rather interest rates that signal 
the monetary policy stance. The choice of an interest rate 
policy is not at odds with the important role of money in 
the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy. Attainment of 
the ultimate objective in fact concerns a different horizon 
– the medium term, according to the definition of price 
stability – as opposed to the operational conduct of mon-
etary policy where it is the very short term that matters. 
The comparative advantage of monetary analysis as an 
indicator of risks to price stability applies primarily in the 
medium and long term.26
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